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Among many theories supported by SMT solvers, the theory of finite-precision
bit-vector arithmetic is one of the most useful, for both hardware and software
systems verification. This theory is also particularly useful for some specific do-
mains such as cryptography, in which algorithms are naturally expressed in terms
of bit-vectors. Cryptol is an example of a domain-specific language (DSL) and
toolset for cryptography developed by Galois, Inc.; providing an SMT backend
that relies on bit-vector decision procedures to certify the correctness of cryp-
tographic specifications [3]. Most of these decision procedures use bit-blasting
to reduce a bit-vector problem into pure propositional SAT. Unfortunately bit-
blasting does not scale very well, especially in the presence of operators like mul-
tiplication or division. For example, the equality x2[n]−1[n] = (x[n]+1[n])×(x[n]−
1[n]) is a simple consequence of distributivity and associativity laws; but even for
small values of n the bit-level representation of this formula is so huge that it is in-
tractable by current SAT solvers. The main reason for this is the loss of high-level
algebraic structure present in the original decision problem. The point here is
that one can exploit algebraic properties concerning the domain of bit-vectors to
rewrite this problem into an equisatisfiable, but computationally less hard, prob-
lem. For instance, the above equality can be proved valid as follows (subscripts
are omitted for clarity): x2 − 1 = (x + 1)× (x− 1) ≡{distributivity×3; associativity}
x2 − 1 = x2 + x− x− 1 ≡{inverse; right identity} x2 − 1 = x2 − 1 ≡{reflexivity} true.
Modern SMT solvers already include a simplification phase that performs some
rewriting on the input problem prior to bit-blasting [4]. Nevertheless, SMT
solvers have to deal with a vast range of application domains, and hence the
set of rewrite rules employed for simplification inevitably excludes many rules
that are useful for some particular domains but may be inconvenient for others.
Sometimes such rules are so important for specific problem domains that these
are not effectively handled without them.
The present work was motivated by the difficulties reported by the Galois
Cryptol team in achieving automatic equivalence checking for public-key cryp-
tography (PKC). PKC is particularly hard because it involves multiplication
and modular exponentiation on long bit-vectors. Hence, the bit-level represen-
tation of any PKC algorithm is usually so huge that such equivalence problems
are too hard for current SAT solvers, unless a significant amount of rewriting
is performed before bit-blasting. SMT solvers employing high-level rewriting-
based techniques have been shown to be promising, but they are still insuf-
ficiently powerful to handle hard problems, such as those resulting from PKC.
This problem may be addressed by combining custom rewrite patterns, somehow
encapsulating domain-specific proof strategies, with standard bit-vector decision
procedures. Our first attempt consisted in extending SMT specifications with
algebraic properties provided in the form of quantified formulas, expecting the
SMT solver to use them as rewrite rules. Unfortunately, we have found that most
of the times SMT solvers do not use these rules effectively, and even become quite
unpredictable in the presence of universal quantifiers. After this failed attempt,
we prototyped a rewriting system in Maude [1] that focuses on simplifying PKC
equivalence problems. Employing a set of 200 hand-crafted rewrite rules and a
very simple rewriting strategy enabled us to achieve quite promising results. For
instance, this system proved the correctness of a 16-bit peasant multiplier and
SHA-1 specifications in a few seconds, while the 3.2 version of Z3 [2] timeouts
(16 hours) for the peasant case and quickly runs out of memory (2 GB) solving
the SHA-1 one. Using this rewriting system as a preprocessing step for Z3 we
also achieved good speedups for some equivalence problems, such as a speedup
of 2 for an 8-bit modular exponentiation algorithm.
Even though there is still considerable work to be done in order to reach a
reasonable degree of automation for PKC equivalence checking, the above re-
sults show the potential of the term-rewriting approach. In the same way proof
assistants allow defining custom tactics to encapsulate specific proof techniques,
our intention is to encode those proof tactics as rewrite patterns in the context
of SMT solving. This allows simplifications that drastically reduce the size of the
input problem before bit-blasting, leading to better overall performance. Ideally,
SMT solvers should allow easy customization of their solving strategies with such
rules —we are aware of some recent work in this direction. It is worth noting
that we are not relying on complex combinations of rewriting strategies, what
would make our approach more fragile and less scalable. Finally, Maude turned
out to be a good platform for experimentation, but it significantly restricts the
strategies that we could employ and presents some limitations to achieved per-
fect subterm sharing. Thus we are presently working on a framework to specify
custom rewriting-based simplifications for fixed-size bit-vector arithmetic, that
should allow us to overtake the above limitations.
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